18 DLR (4th) 321 . . . . . . . . . 49, 99, 158, 170 R v. Boulter (1908 ) 72 JP 188 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367 R v. Bradlaugh (1883 ) 15 Cox CC 217 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367 R v. Carlile (1819 4 St Tr (NS) 1424 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367 R v. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, ex p Choudhury [1991 . . . 1, 4, 7, 99, 100, 110, 112, 120, 123, 155, 164, 184, 185, 187-9, 194, 201, 218, 220-1, 223, 224, 232, 243, 256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 Crimes Act 1961 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289 Guardianship Act 1968 s 14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209 Human Rights Act 1993 s 28(1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315 s 28(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155, 300 Juries Act 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . First, in the last decade or so, sociologists of religion and other social theorists have had to revise their attachment to one of the bulwarks of their discipline: secularization theory. Religion, at the end of the twentieth century, made a 'comeback'. Modernization, and its cousin, secularization, were meant to lead inexorably to a decline in religion, both at a societal and individual level. Yet, as Peter Berger points out, 'the assumption that we live in a secularized world is false: The world today, with some exceptions . . . is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so than ever '.⁷ In global terms the 'two most dynamic religious movements', notes Berger, are Pentecostalism and Islam.⁸ Ironically, it is faiths of a more 'traditional', 'conservative' something suspect in those who are sure that they are right, since it might imply that someone else is wrong. From a religious point of view, however, open-mindedness is principally valuable in the search for Truth, and not as a permanent nesting place . . . For this and other reasons, the ideal of the liberal citizen thus conflicts with the ideal of belief in religion or in any other comprehensive faith or ideology. To the extent that the state pursues this new vision of the liberal citizen and enforces its vision by force, religious freedom is gravely endangered. Indeed, liberalism in the old sense is itself endangered, for it becomes not a set of political arrangements by which persons of widely differing views can live together in relative harmony, but a narrow and sectarian program enforcing its dogmas by force.⁴¹ Liberalism, in its secularist, comprehensive form, rightfully deserves criticism. This kind of liberal state is not neutral.⁴² The mirage of perfect neutrality is, indeed, a leitmotif throughout this book.
Modern liberalism, in its secularist mutation, prefers religion to be domesticated, tamed: ' "open-minded" . . . stripped down and soft-edged'⁴³ as Stanley Fish jibes, 'a tepid, civic version of the faith', as Justice Scalia termed it recently.⁴⁴ Religious passions ought to be quelled; faith is best treated by good liberal citizens as a mere subjective, individual preference or taste among many, a mere 'hobby'.⁴⁵ Robert Booth Fowler quips: 'Everyone will be "nice" and go their own way. American religion may sometimes decry the liberal world it knows, but on the whole, religion is very nice and it is for nice people.'⁴⁶ More seriously he adds: 'Religions or religious groups that do not play this game may encounter trouble, though far less in a liberal culture than in any other of which I know.'⁴⁷ The aim of this book is to explore why, when and how religious individuals and groups that 'do not play the game' encounter difficulty in the liberal state. Fowler is correct in remarking that religionists, by and large, experience fewer problems, involving the free exercise of their faith, in liberal polities than other systems. Yet, there is, we suggest, no reason to be complacent. As Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe reminded the House of Lords recently: 'in matters of human rights the court should not show liberal tolerance only to tolerant liberals.'⁴⁸ There are plausible grounds for believing that a growing number and variety of difficult religious freedom challenges lie ahead.
This study takes a non-neutral stance, in the sense that we traverse the subject from a Christian perspective. More specifically, ours is an evangelical Christian approach.⁴⁹ We make no apology for this. Although much of our focus, and many of our examples and cases, address Christians' struggles over freedom of religion, our study is not confined to these. The principle of religious freedom in liberal democracies is valuable (and to be valued) for all persons of all faiths and creeds.
In terms of coverage, we have necessarily been forced to omit some areas. So, for instance, we have not covered (except in passing), issues of religious liberty in environments such as prisons,⁵⁰ or the military,⁵¹ nor discrete law and religion problems such as the clergy-parishioner privilege,⁵² nor the challenges raised by particular religious groups such as indigenous peoples⁵³ or the New Religious Movements. ⁵⁴ We have structured our discussion into three divisions. Part I contrasts liberal and Christian perspectives on religion and religious liberty. In Part II, we examine key legal and constitutional issues concerning the protection of, and limits to, the right of religious freedom. Part III traverses certain areas of contemporary controversy over the ambit of freedom of religion. The issues raised by the theme of each chapter in Part III are explored in a broad fashion without anchoring the discus
